South Africa proudly wears the label 'emerging power', with its membership of the BRICS and G20 probably the most visible signs of this conferred status. This paper explores the concept of the emerging powers within the context of current global power shifts and locates South Africa within this group. It discusses the criteria for and characteristics of emerging powers, and then turns to some of the constraints and challenges faced by these states. Specific attention is paid to the 'how' of these states' recognition and inclusion in global institutions and to the impact of domestic conditions and regional politics on their positions, focusing particularly on South Africa. It concludes that these factors will continue to challenge South Africa's ability to rise above the semblance of importance conferred by its inclusion in the category of emerging powers to a position in which it exercises this status to its own advantage, including its idealistic objectives of promoting greater global equality and recognition for Africa and the global South. Although other emerging powers face similar challenges, South Africa's domestic constraints and related lack of regional and global reach, politically and economically, threatens its 'status consistency' as an emerging power
Introduction
The Twenty Year Review: South Africa 1994-2014, issued by the Presidency, 2 claims that 'South Africa's standing in BRICS and other groupings indicates that the country is regarded as a significant emerging power, worthy of attention in global decision-making.' Internationally, too, South Africa is generally perceived, and referred to, as an emerging power -a description and classification, as far as these typologies go, that denotes something closer to a future big power than to the more traditional second tier of powers in the international system classified as 'middle powers'. As will be demonstrated below, the label of emerging power rather than middle power conveys more overt status and potential for influence internationally, and is therefore a more attractive and prestigious role conception. Such a description is but one side of the coin, though: within the harsh realities of a current 'age of disorder' will remain the operative word within the term, reminiscent of the expression 'Brazil is the country of the future… and it always will be'? 4 The purpose of this article is to explore whether South Africa's inclusion in the group of emerging powers and its self-identification as an emerging power has remained largely a mere ascribed position in the global hierarchy of power with little substance in terms of the country's role in the international system, or whether it actually reflects a greater degree of influence for South Africa's foreign policy in terms of the country's conduct and the achievement of its goals and objectives. 3 The paper is divided into three sections. The first section serves to set the scene by describing the way in which the structure of the international system is changing in terms of a power shift that allows for the rise of new powers with an impact on global governance. The second section explores the criteria and characteristics that identify emerging powers as a category of states operating with increasing confidence and influence in the international system, and assesses the extent to which South Africa meets these. Section three turns to the constraints and challenges faced by emerging powers, focusing specifically on South Africa's domestic concerns and its efforts to represent the continent internationally.
The analysis will aim to provide a means of distinguishing between mere description or flat categorisation ('South Africa is an emerging power') on the one hand, and the ways in which the country's foreign policy reflects, at a deeper level, the expectations implied by this categorisation. The current shift in global power relations is analysed and explained broadly from two perspectives in contemporary scholarship. The first is liberal internationalism which tends to theorise the shift in a top-down manner by focusing mainly on the international system and the extent to which global governance -the networks of rules, standards and acceptable conduct internationally 7 -is affected by this shift. The second is a perspective relying more on a political economy approach embedded in a macro-sociological analysis of the globalising capitalist system that understands global shifts from, simplistically put, the bottom up, by focusing on state-society complexes, usually from a 'long historical' perspective. 8 Both perspectives provide important insights and allow for explaining state behaviour and the opportunities and challenges facing those states ascending to leadership positions in the global system. Both view the power shift as part of the expansion of capitalism that has become a thoroughly globalised system in the aftermath of the Cold War.
For liberal internationalists the power shift is not so much a 'shift' as a process of expansion where the opportunity, as well as the need, arises for 'new powers' to participate in setting the rules within which the system functions. Africa, and to some extent, the continent, economically, due largely to the fact that it is the most advanced and industrialised economy in Africa. Over the past two decades it has increased its economic footprint on the continent significantly, be this through increased volumes of exports -mainly manufactured products -or the presence of big South African corporations across the continent and in terms of direct investment. 24 Compared to most for exerting influence in global politics. 25 Add to this its track record as a donor 26 on the continent and its extensive bilateral reach as far as diplomatic ties are concerned 27 and one could make an argument that it complies loosely with Hurrell's criteria.
Of course, a strong counter-argument could be made on each of these criteria.
The country compares rather poorly to some of its BRICS partners when it comes to economic growth and the level of diversity of its economy. Its export basket to Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries may consist of 65% manufactured goods, but in world export terms 57% of its total exports are minerals and raw materials, and 79% of its exports to Asia are minerals and raw materials, 28 indicating, still, a rather limited economic power base that is highly dependent on international price fluctuations and an export profile that does not compare well with that of other BRICS economies. Its
African footprint, with reference to exports, is also largely limited to its immediate neighbourhood, with 86% of its exports going to SADC and only 14% to the rest of the continent. A key characteristic of emerging powers is therefore that although they can fulfil some of the traditional middle power functions in the international system, the emphasis is on their aspiration to 'first tier' status. 31 At the same time, they do not necessarily support the status quo; they are emerging powers exactly because they bring reformist/revisionist ideas and values, and the ability to project and promote these. as a regional power has never been in doubt, despite, at times, a lack of evidence that it could turn this label into status (as will be discussed below). It has also used this position as one of the means to elevate itself into an emerging power, emphasising its role as a spokesperson for and representative of Africa, a bridge into the continent and a regional institution builder.
A last characteristic that needs mention is acceptance of the label, and selfdefinition as an emerging power, based both on external ascription and an element of national identity. South Africa enjoys emerging power recognition, The very criteria and characteristics of emerging powers also account for the constraints and challenges that these states experience and the opportunities that they have for living up to this status. Emerging powers are expected to prove their worth in shouldering at least some of the responsibilities that big powers carry in the international system in providing global public goods, while navigating a course through the rather choppy waters of the changing global order. In 'exercising' the role of an emerging power, these states face a number of challenges and constraints, be these at home or in their external environment.
Add-in, add-on or alternative?
The first challenge has to do with the manoeuvring space for these powers to exert influence through agenda setting and rule-making -the hallmarks of great power status. There is an inherent tension in the label 'emerging power':
the history of how these powers came to be recognised as important or This question is crucial as it denotes the difference between merely being labelled as an emerging power and the actual status of being an influential global player -a status that implies power diffusion (opportunities for agenda setting) rather than 'merely' joining the club and supporting the agenda/s of those who hold real power (in which case 'emerging powers' would be little more than traditional 'middle powers').
At its core, the position of emerging powers in the international system has to do with whether the existing great powers (the G7/8) perceive the emerging powers' involvement at the highest levels of global governance as being an 'add on, or an 'add in', ie, an attempt to get buy-in and support from these countries through some form of association with the 'old' powers, or full incorporation into this system in order to prevent a third outcome, viz, the creation of alternative governance institutions, which could undermine the reigning global normative framework developed and dominated by the traditional, Western great powers. 39 Initially the 'add on' approach was used, with some countries -emerging powers, but also some of the emerging markets -being invited to join parts of the G8 summits, And so it has, and continues to do so. Restructuring of the UN Security Council remains central to the country's foreign policy objectives, 44 and it has formally expressed its interest in becoming a permanent member of the council. 45 If the 
Regional politics… and national interests
Emerging powers are expected to be regional powers and to act as regional stabilisers. 47 Much of the scholarship dealing with emerging powers argues that one of the main challenges to these powers is the fact that they do not enjoy undisputed regional leadership positions, though one should be careful not to equate 'regional power' with 'regional leadership' if the latter carries the meaning of acceptance as a leader, rather than recognition. . 48 In addition, the continuing xenophobia in the country has deeply undermined the country's relations with the rest of the continent. 49 Yet it stakes its claim on emerging power status mainly on the 'fact' that it represents Africa and that it 'speaks on behalf of' the continent, and its foreign policy conduct over the past two decades shows a very strong commitment in this sphere. There is little doubt that the emerging powers' claims to big power status are first and foremost based on the tangible indices of size and the fact that the size of their economies and militaries in many instances surpasses that of the traditional big powers. South Africa's initial inclusion in the group of emerging powers (the O5) was largely based on its normative legitimacy, as argued earlier, yet increasingly, in its own role conception, it relies on its representative role in order to cement its emerging power status. Apart from its draft foreign policy document of 2011 50 which is suffused with references to its leadership role on the African continent, its efforts during the hosting of the
BRICS Summit in Durban to include its African peers in deliberations point
to this conception of a regional leader and representative. This does not mean that South Africa does not promote international justice, but it promotes it on behalf of Africa and on the basis of an unjust international governance order. 51 Little wonder then that scholars such as Olivier 52 criticise the country's foreign policy as being driven by a revisionist ideology rather than by careful attention to its national interests.
The fact of the matter is that the country's emerging power status may be too it fails through its foreign policy to address its domestic vulnerabilities. Not a single big power has attained this status without also being able to utilise it to its own advantage, and very often this started with greater economic interaction within its own region. 53 South Africa has not reached this point yet,
despite an impressive increase in exports (especially service and manufactures)
to the rest of the continent. It suffers the drawback of competition within
Africa from other emerging powers like China, Brazil and India, but it may also 20 be a case of not exploiting opportunities sufficiently. In this sense South Africa may have to seriously re-think the role and the training of its diplomatic corps.
Domestic constraints
In his analysis of the Heiligendamm process, 54 Vickers argues that costs, capacity and external constraints play a key role in the extent to which South Africa can participate in global governance. Domestically, after more than two decades of freedom and democracy, the country is battling deep divisions within its society, especially along racial lines.
These divisions are exacerbated by the triple challenge of addressing poverty, inequality and unemployment in the face of lacklustre economic growth.
During the period 1994 to 2014 unemployment (narrowly defined) increased from 20% to 26% (a broad definition of unemployment indicates a 36% unemployment rate), 58 with the proportion of unemployed youth (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) years in age) at almost 50%. 59 The percentage of black Africans living in poverty increased by 10% between 1994 and 2014, 60 while the wage share of gross domestic product decreased from 56% in 1994 to 50,6% by 2010. 61 In 1996 the ratio of white per capita income to that of other races was 3.9 to 1; by 2012 it had increased to 4.5 to 1, 62 resulting in frustration and tension along racial lines. Poverty remains pervasive. About 16m South Africans are dependent on social grants -this out of a total population of more than 50m, while the country is faced with a dwindling tax base: in 2013 the country had 15,4m registered taxpayers (this number increased to 16,8m in 2014) with approximately 6,5m of these submitting tax returns. 63 As is the case for Brazil, India and China, these challenges will increasingly inhibit the country's ability to play a leading role internationally, as leadership attention, resources and energy will have to be expended at home, and not abroad. At least part of the Analysts and commentators have for a considerable time been pointing to the lack of sufficient resources for the defence force (specifically for the army which bears the brunt of peacekeeping deployments) and point to the 'total mismatch between operational commitments and funding.' 65 Esterhuyse norms and values remains to be seen, but for South Africa an added uncertainty will be whether it can turn this label into a status that will reflect
